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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT WILLIAM LABRUM, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF 
PARDONS, et al. , 
Respondents. 
REPLY AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 
OF UTAH STATE PRISON INMATES 
This Brief is written in response to the brief of Respondents 
filed November 16, 1992. While it is specifically filed on behalf 
of the named inmates who appear as amicus curiae, this brief 
essentially represents the position of every inmate in the Utah 
State Prison system who must at one time or another appear before 
the Utah State Board of Pardons. 
The Brief of Respondents is basically broken into five 
divisions. First, Respondents attack the particular facts and 
circumstances of petitioner Robert William Labrum and contend that 
this matter is not properly before this Court because of the 
procedures below. Second, Respondents argue that the Foote 
decision of this Court is incorrect and that sentencing due 
process rights should not apply to Utah State Prison inmates in 
parole proceedings. Third, Respondents contend that minimal due 
process rights should be imposed upon the Board of Pardons if it 
is not a sentencing body. Fourth, Respondents argue that this 
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Priority No. 13 
Court, in any event, is an improper forum for such a determination 
to be made and that the matter should be remanded to a lower court 
for hearing. Finally, Respondents argue as to the due process 
specifics of attorney representation, access to files, and 
evidentiary hearings. 
For the convenience of this Court and the parties these 
answering amicus curiae will refer to the arguments made by 
Respondents in the same sequence as they are raised in their 
Brief. This method will allow this Court to more easily focus 
upon the arguments and counter-arguments being raised. 
Before proceeding, however, it should be noted that the 
respondents have seemingly failed to specifically address the 
arguments contained in the opening Brief of these amicus curiae or 
that filed by the public defender. Not a single page reference to 
either brief is contained in the respondents' Brief. Numerous 
arguments made by these amicus curiae have therefore not been 
addressed whatsoever in the respondents' Brief while, on the other 
hand, arguments not raised by any party or amicus curiae are 
addressed by the respondents. These specific additions and 
omissions will be discussed in the appropriate area of the 
Argument portion of this Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT MAY PROCEDURALLY ADDRESS THE 
ISSUE OF PAROLE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN 
SPITE OF RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS TO THE 
CONTRARY. 
Respondents cite numerous factual allegations in their 
"Statement of the Case" which apply specifically to petitioner 
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Robert Labrum. (Respondents' Brief, 7-9). These amicus curiae 
are without sufficient information to address these assertions. 
It is believed, however, that these same arguments were raised and 
rejected by a panel of this Court on June 1, 1992. 
Next, Respondents state that "the case should be brought 
under 65B(c), "Wrongful Restraint on Personal Liberty and Habeas 
Corpus Relief." (Respondents1 Brief, 10). This assertion is made 
because petitioner Labrum "requests the Board to rehear his case 
based on alleged procedural deficiencies at a November 1987 
hearing." (JcL_) . Although this statement is true, Petitioner 
also requested this Court to direct the Board of Pardons to 
disclose its entire file to Petitioner and to give Petitioner a 
reasonable opportunity to rebut any misinformation in its file. 
As such, therefore, Petitioner has correctly filed an 
extraordinary writ asking this Court to order corrective action 
of a state agency. 
The case of Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1991) upon which this case is based, was originally brought 
as an extraordinary writ proceeding requesting mandamus by this 
Court. In addition to this Courtfs approval of such procedural 
device, other state courts have also approved the use of mandamus 
to review the constitutional procedures of state parole systems. 
For example, the Indiana Supreme Court in Murphy v. Indiana 
Parole Board, 397 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. 1979) stated the 
following: 
It is true that there is no right to an appeal, in 
the usual sense, from the decision of the Parole Board, 
but Due Process requires that judicial review be 
available to insure that the requirements of Due Process 
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have been met and that the Parole Board has acted within 
the scope of its powers. 
See also Donnell v. Commonwealth, 434 A.2d 846 (Pa. 1981); 
Goldsworthy v. Hannifin, 468 P.2d 350 (Nev. 1970). 
It should also be noted that mandamus is a broader remedy 
than is habeas corpus. Mandamus can be utilized to make sweeping 
changes in the procedures of a governmental agency. See e.g., 
Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App. 1988). 
Habeas Corpus actions, on the other hand, concern specific liberty 
interests of an individual and concern the facts and circumstances 
of his or her particular case rather than correction of the system 
as a whole. For example, the normal defendant in a habeas corpus 
action is the prisoner's custodian. The Board of Pardons is an 
additional party if parole proceedures are disputed. Estes v. Van 
Per Veur, 824 P.2d 1200 (Utah App. 1992). For these reasons, 
therefore, the procedural context of this case is proper. 
Based upon their erroneous argument that this matter must be 
characterized as habeas corpus, Respondents next contend that any 
such action is barred by Section 78-12-31.1, U.C.A. which requires 
that a habeas corpus action must be commenced within three months 
from the time the petitioner knows of grounds for relief or should 
have known of such grounds. (Respondents' Brief, 11-12). Of 
course , this argument is inapplicable since a petition for 
extraordinary writ does not have such a time limitation. However, 
if this statute is deemed applicable to this litigation then the 
statute itself must be held unconstitutional. Both the United 
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution provide that the 
"privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended." 
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Article 1, Section 9; Article 1, Section 5. The statute relied 
upon by the state would clearly suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
after the three month period had expired even though a petitioner 
has a meritorious constitutional claim. Moreover, in some 
instances a prisoner is unable to procedurally file a writ of 
habeas corpus regardless of his knowledge because of other 
requirements such as in cases where his direct appeal has not 
yet been decided. Thus, the state's effort to procedurally 
eliminate this appeal must fail. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN FOOTE 
IS CORRECT AND THE ARGUMENTS NOW ASSERTED 
BY RESPONDENTS ATTEMPT TO PUT FORM OVER 
SUBSTANCE IN MAINTAINING THAT THE BOARD 
OF PARDONS DOES NOT DETERMINE THE LIBERTY 
INTEREST OF A PRISON INMATE. 
Respondents devote a great deal of space in their brief to an 
attack upon this Court's decision in Foote v. Utah Board of 
Pardons. (Respondents' Brief, 13-30). Apparently, Respondents 
want a second "bite at the apple" in an effort to decimate or 
seriously weaken this Court's opinion in Foote. These amicus 
curiae welcome the opportunity to address the arguments now being 
made by the State since there is no question but that this Court 
was absolutely correct in its analysis and conclusions reached in 
the Foote decision. 
The State vigorously argues that the Board of Pardons is not 
a sentencing body and relies upon numerous statutory citations and 
case decisions to support its assertion. (Respondents' Brief, 
13-17). The respondents argue that the term "sentencing" must be 
strictly construed and that it must only refer to the process in 
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which a judge imposes a range of years to a convicted defendant. 
Respondents argue that "parole is merely a rehabilitation tool, 
not a part of the criminal process" and that it does not "have 
authority to enhance or modify a sentence imposed by a trial 
court." (Respondents' Brief, 15-16). These arguments are 
completely without merit. 
If the only power of the Board of Pardons was, as a matter of 
grace, to allow the early release of an inmate who was serving a 
definite number of years, then the arguments of Respondents would 
have some validity. In such a case, it can be argued that the 
trial court has set the maximum number of years of incarceration 
that a defendant will serve, and absent the express intervention 
of the Board of Pardons, the defendant will serve the entire term. 
Here, on the other hand, no such situation exists. The sentencing 
court establishes a range of years the defendant may be 
incarcerated. Whether a defendant serves one year or 15 years 
requires the affirmative action of the Board of Pardons. The 
Board thus has complete control over the liberty of the inmate 
during the entire range of sentence. In essence, therefore, the 
Utah system of sentencing is a two-stage process in which the 
judge establishes a range and the Board of Pardons establishes the 
exact parole date. Respondents themselves note, "the Board's role 
is to determine the physical conditions under which the offender's 
sentence is to be served, via prison or on parole." (Respondents' 
Brief, 16). 
This same "form over substance" argument was raised by the 
U.S. government in Williams v. Turner, 702 F.Supp. 1439 
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(D.Mo. 1988) . In that case the defendant was sentenced to a 
determinate term of ten years incarceration. However, the Federal 
Board of Pardons in following its matrix guidelines would normally 
parole such an individual between 24 and 36 months. 
The defendant was required to give testimony against another 
prisoner in an ancillary proceeding and based upon such testimony 
the Federal Board ordered that he serve a total of 80 months. The 
government argued that the petitioner suffered no penalty as a 
result of his testimony and was not entitled to assert a liberty 
interest giving rise to due process. The Federal District Court 
rejected this argument and stated: 
However, does one whose presumed parole date is 
pushed beyond that recommended by the sentencing 
guidelines, due to considerations of compelled 
testimony, "suffer no penalty?" The respondents maintain 
that no penalty is suffered since the Commission's 
action "did not result in a new sentence or an enhanced 
sentence; petitioner's sentence remained ten years.".... 
The petitioner states that such reasoning places form 
before substance because though "the mathematical term 
of petitioner's sentence (10 years) is not lengthened, 
the term of confinement is clearly lenghtened.".... 
The Court concludes that a penalty is suffered 
because a liberty interest is involved. A substantial 
liberty from legal restraint is at stake any time the 
government makes decisions regarding parole or 
probation. Liberty from bodily restraint always had 
been recognized as the core of the liberty interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary 
government actions. Ingrahm v. Wright, 403 U.S. 
651 (1977). IcL. at 1445. 
It is equally absurd to argue that constitutional sentencing 
protections should be afforded to a defendant when a court imposes 
a sentence of five years to life but should not be imposed upon 
the Board of Pardons when the term "life" is actually converted 
into a fixed number of years. It is clearly the liberty interest 
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of the inmate during his incarceration which this Court in Foote 
wished to protect in stating that the Board of Pardons does 
participate in the sentencing process. 
The respondents have similarly twisted their discussion of 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). (Respondents1 Brief, 
22-23). Respondents attempt to use the Morrissey decision to 
argue that the establishment of a parole date is not a part of the 
criminal process. In fact, however, the Morrissey decision did 
not in any way addressed Iowa's indeterminate sentencing system 
but instead was solely directed to parole revocation proceedings. 
As to those proceedings the Court clearly found that due process 
protections applied. The Court held that the liberty of a parolee 
who is in the community includes many of the core values of 
unqualified liberty and that its termination inflicts a "grievous 
loss" on the parolee and often on others. "By whatever name, the 
liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly 
process, however informal." 408 U.S. at 482. 
The Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Greenholtz v. 
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) and Board of 
Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) clearly establish that this 
"liberty" interest requires protection in cases not involving 
revocation but in those in which the original parole is being 
determined. 
In its efforts to argue that the Board of Pardons does not 
act as a sentencing body the respondents state, "Offenders who 
have committed similar crimes, regardless of the district in 
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which the crime was committed or the sentencing court, receive 
more uniform terms of incarceration when the releasing authority 
has a broader picture of the crimes committed throughout the 
state," (Respondents' Brief, 25). In other words, Respondents 
maintain that the Board of Pardons is able to impose equal 
sentences to equal criminal conduct because of the indeterminate 
sentencing procedure now being utilized. 
In the Federal system, this same argument has been advanced 
both under the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976 
and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Under the former, the 
United States Parole Commission was required by statute to 
promulgate guidelines for the exercise of its parole power. 
"These guidelines are meant to reduce the disparity in treatment 
of similarly situated inmates by providing f a fundamental gauge by 
which parole determinations are made.1" H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong, 
and Admin. News, 335, 359. Congress thus intended that the 
guidelines "serve as a national parole policy which seeks to 
achieve both equality between individual cases and a uniform 
measure of justice." Id. A number of Federal courts have held 
that the guideline formulation for uniformity creates a liberty 
interest requiring application of due process of law. Evans v. 
Dillahunty, 662 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1981); Solomon v. Elsea, 676 
F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Turner, 702 F.Supp. 1439 
(D. Mo. 1988); Dixon v. Hadden, 550 F.Supp. 157 (D.Colo. 
1982). 
Likewise, one of the principal reasons for enacting the 
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Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to create a new system 
of judge-ordered determinate sentences to be imposed solely upon 
sentencing guidelines, to establish uniformity throughout the 
country, and to abolish the concept of parole- Romano v. Luther, 
816 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1987). Due process requirements clearly 
are applicable in all federal sentencing procedures under the new 
law. 
Thus, the argument made by Respondents that the Board of 
Pardons allows uniform sentencing to occur throughout the state 
actually supports the concept that the Board is acting as a super 
sentencing authority. 
In summary, this Court's statement in Foote that the Board 
of Pardons "performs a function analogous to that of the trial 
judge in jurisdictions that have a determinate sentencing scheme" 
is absolutely correct and the statutory, historical, and policy 
arguments made by the respondents do not alter this conclusion. 
The State has conceded that if the Board of Pardons is deemed 
a sentencing body the same protections applicable to a trial court 
sentencing procedure are also applicable here. (Respondents' 
Brief, 25). Since this is clearly the case, the rights of 
counsel, access to reliable information, calling of witnesses, and 
other inherent rights of sentencing must be applied to parole 
hearings in order to satisfy due process and equal protection. 
POINT III 
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE BOARD 
OF PARDONS DOES NOT FUNCTION AS A 
SENTENCING BODY, INMATES ARE NEVERTHELESS 
ENTITLED TO SUBSTANTIAL DUE PROCESS 
PROTECTIONS. 
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Again, the respondents1 attempt to relitigate the issues 
originally raised in Foote. After summarizing various federal 
cases concerning liberty interests, the respondents conclude, "It 
is obvious that the Federal Constitution does not require any 
procedural due process at parole hearings before the Utah Board of 
Pardons. (Respondents' Brief, 26-29). While these amicus curiae 
acknowledge the hornbook law recited by the respondents they do 
not acknowledge the conclusion drawn by them. 
The Federal law is clear that official statutes or official 
regulations are not the only source of a liberty interest. A 
protected Federal liberty interest may also arise when 
"particularized standards or criteria guide the state decision 
makers." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983). In 
Lucas v. Hodges, 730 F.2d 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1984) the court 
held that official statements of prison policy contained in 
internal directives of officials at the District of Columbia 
Detention Facility could give rise to a liberty interest even 
though the statements were not promulgated under the 
Administrative Procedure Act or published in the District of 
Columbia Register. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Walker v. Hughes, 568 F.2d 1247, 1254-56 (6th Cir. 1977) 
found a liberty interest in policy statements issued by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Warden of a Federal institution 
even though neither had been promulgated under the Administrative 
Procedure standards or published in the Federal Register. 
In Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1291 (6th Cir. 1980) 
the Court held that a liberty interest was established by a prison 
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rule contained in a "'Adult Service Policies and Procedure Manual 
of the Department of Correction Guideline," The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 
1980) found a protected liberty interest in the "Official 
Statement of Policy" issued by the administrator of one Colorado 
penetentiary. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that a 
liberty interest may be created by "intra and inter-institutional 
directives containing guidelines for allowing and denying 
compensatory good time." Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37, 47 
(7th Cir. 1978). 
In a concurring opinion Justice Brennan stated that to show a 
federally protected liberty interest "respondents must show—by 
reference to statute, regulation, administrative practice, 
contractual arrangements or other mutual understandings—that 
particularized standards or criteria guides the state decision 
makers." Connecticutt Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 
458, 467 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Hewitt v. 
Helms, 459 U.S. 460 where Justice Stephens stated, "It does not 
matter whether the state uses a particular form of words in its 
laws or regulations, or indeed whether it has adopted written 
rules at all." Id. at 486 n. 12. 
These amicus curiae contend that the Sentencing Guidelines 
now utilized in this state by both judges and the Board of Pardons 
creates an expectation which gives rise to a federal liberty 
interest. These guidelines were created by the Utah Commission of 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice which consisted of judges, 
administrators and lawyers from all facets of the criminal and 
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corrective law system. These guidelines are utilized by a 
defendant's attorney in advising a defendant whether to plead 
guilty or not, are used by probation officers in preparing 
presentence reports, are used by sentencing judges in determining 
the type of sentence to be imposed, are used by prison screening 
officials in determining where to place an inmate for 
incarceration, and are used by the Board of Pardons to evaluate 
the time an inmate should be incarcerated. Thus, even under the 
conservative due process analysis by the majority opinion in 
Greenholtz the Utah Sentencing Guidelines create a type of 
expectancy which gives rise to a federally protected liberty 
interest. 
The question of federal due process rights as it relates to 
the Utah Parole System, however, is essentially moot since this 
Court in Foote did not find it necessary to analyze federal 
standards in light of the clear Utah State constitutional mandate 
and in light of the differing types of prison systems existing in 
the Federal and state jurisdiction. Thus, unless this Court 
desires to make a federal constitutional law analysis based upon 
the sentencing guidelines as stated above, this Court is free to 
evaluate state due process free from any federal court decisions. 
Respondents assert that under this Court's decision in Foote, 
"Apparently, the Utah Constitution no longer requires a legitimate 
expectation under its due process clause." (Respondents1 Brief, 
29). This analysis by Respondents is clearly incorrect. The 
Court in Foote found that the Utah system of indeterminate 
sentencing created a continuing liberty interest both in the trial 
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court and before the Board of Pardons. The intent of the framers 
of the Utah State Constitution was to provide due process 
protection whenever liberty in the form of incarceration had been 
jeopardized. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in 
Tasker v. Mohn, 267 S.E.2d 183 (W.Va. 1980) criticized the 
majority opinion in Greenholtz as based upon an unrealistic 
distinction in allowing due process rights to apply to parole 
revocation hearings but not to original parole hearings. The 
Court stated: 
The problem that the Supreme Court majority has is 
whether expectation of parole release is co-extensive 
with the liberty interest in staying on parole. It 
doubts the legitimacy of the expectation of parole. If 
the expectation represents a statutory entitlement, it 
recognizes that due process is required.... 
The entitlement concept is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's approach to due process in other 
context, but we believe the Court falters in its 
emphasis on the statutory language. The Court, prior to 
Greenholtz and in other contexts, recognized that 
"only an unusual prisoner would be expected to think 
that he was not suffering a penalty when he was denied 
eligibility of parole." Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 
62. (Idi. at 187) . 
In United States Ex Rel Johnson v. Chairman, New York 
State Board of Pardons, 500 F.2d 925 (2nd Cir. 1974) the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
Parole was henceforth to be treated as a 
"conditional liberty" representing an "interest" 
entitled to due process protection. A prisoner's 
interest in prospective parole, or "conditional 
entitlement" must be treated in like fashion. To hold 
otherwise would be to create a distinction too 
gossamer-thin to stand close analysis. Whether the 
immediate issue be release or revocation, the stakes are 
the same: conditional freedom versus incarceration. 
Id. at 500. (Emphasis added). 
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Justice Powell in the Greenholtz decision also observed 
why a state parole system automatically creates a liberty interest 
in those that are incarcerated. He stated: 
Nothing in the Constitution requires a State to 
provide for probation or parole. But when a state 
adopts a parole system that applies general standards of 
eligibility, prisoners justifiably expect that parole 
will be granted fairly and according to law whenever 
those standards are met....I am convinced that the 
presence of a parole system is sufficient to create a 
liberty interest, protected by the Constitution, in the 
parole-release decision....From the day that he is 
sentenced in a state with a parole system, a prisoner 
justifiably expects release on parole when he meets the 
standards of eligibility applicable within that system. 
Greenholtz, supra 99 S.Ct. at 2110 (Powell, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
See also, Goldsworthy v. Hannifin, 468 P.2d 350 (Nev. 
1970); and New Jersey Parole Board v. Bryne, 460 A.2d 103 
(N.J. 1983) . 
Thus, this Court in Foote recognized that a state 
liberty interest clearly exists by the sentencing nature of the 
Board of Pardons under the indeterminate scheme devised by the 
Legislature. Moreover, this Court impliedly recognized that 
perhaps no other group of individuals can claim a more substantial 
"liberty" interest than can incarcerated inmates. In both 
instances, therefore, inmates appearing before the Board of 
Pardons are entitled to state due process protection. The 
arguments raised by Respondents as to whether federal or state due 
process should be afforded are red herrings which detract from the 




THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS 
OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS, 
Respondents argue that they are entitled to a factual hearing 
in which evidence can be produced to determine the due process 
rights now being addressed. (Respondents1 Brief, 3-32). They 
assert that this Court in Foote and the Court of Appeals in 
Northern v. Barnes, 814 P.2d 1148 (Utah App. 1991) recognize the 
need to have an evidentiary hearing. Parenthetically, it should 
be noted that the Northern case merely quotes from the Foote 
decision and therefore makes no separate statement as to the issue 
now being raised by the respondents. 
There are a number of reasons why the arguments made by 
Respondents must fail. The concept of prison due process of law 
does not require factual hearings since procedures utilized by 
prison boards throughout the country are well established and 
numerous court decisions have already interpreted whether such 
procedures are or are not required to comply with due process. 
Thus, this Court as the highest tribunal of the state, should 
decide the due process question as a matter of law in that the 
concepts suggested simply do not require factual input. 
Second, if this matter were remanded for a further hearing 
the Board of Pardons could essentially moot the proceeding as 
occurred in Foote. Once Foote was remanded the Board of 
Pardons immediately granted him parole. As such, therefore, he 
lost standing to complain about the prison parole system and the 
matter was summarily dismissed upon stipulation of counsel. This 
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same event could occur with petitioner Labrum. 
Third, under the present statutes and regulations there is no 
source of funds available to represent the petitioner or the other 
inmates in conducting the full evidentiary hearing now 
contemplated by the respondents. In Foote an effort was made for 
appointment of counsel under the habeas corpus provisions. The 
lower court rejected such claim and held that counsel would have 
to represent Foote pro bono and essentially bear all costs of 
litigation. Thus, unless the respondents are willing to finance 
the extensive hearings they claim are required— including the 
production of the alleged experts necessary to make this 
determination—then their arguments must be rejected on the basis 
of financial burden alone. 
For these reasons, therefore, the matter of due process 
during parole hearings should be laid to rest once and for all by 
this Court thereby allowing Respondents to litigate any claims of 
undue burden in future proceedings. 
POINT V 
BECAUSE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL LIBERTY INTEREST 
WHICH EACH INMATE HAS, THIS COURT SHOULD 
REQUIRE EQUALLY SUBSTANTIAL DUE PROCESS 
PROCEDURES. 
The respondents have devoted only 11 pages of their Brief to 
the issue raised by this Court, i.e., "What due process rights 
should be accorded an inmate at a Board of Pardons hearing?" 
Respondents have only addressed the issue of attorney 
representation, evidentiary hearings, and access to Board files. 
(Respondents1 Brief, 33-43). They have failed to address in any 
way a number of procedures discussed by these amicus curiae in 
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their opening Brief. These suggested procedures include timely 
notice of hearing, opportunity to properly prepare, dissemination 
of criteria used by the Board of Pardons, limitation of evidence 
allowable by the Board of Pardons, implementation of stringent 
procedures as to matrix guidelines, and establishment of a system 
of limited judicial review. In addition, Respondents have not 
addressed these amicus curiae's claim that the procedural rights 
established in this case should be applied in the future to all 
inmates regardless of their presently scheduled parole hearings. 
See pages 20-46 opening Brief of these amicus curiae. 
Because of Respondents1 failure to discuss the above issues 
no further comment is required in this reply brief. Only those 
areas which are specifically discussed by Respondents will be 
addressed by these amicus curiae. As a general note, the 
regulations which allegedly will go into effect in January of 1993 
should have no effect upon this Court's decision concerning the 
due process rights of inmates. While the effort of the Board of 
Pardons is commendable, it must be kept in mind that such 
amendment would not have occurred had this Court not rendered the 
Foote decision. Since regulations can come and go at the whim and 
caprice of the Board of Pardons, it is essential that this Court 
establish judicial principles of due process which will insure 
that all future regulations contain the required procedure. 
Otherwise, the regulations now being argued by the respondents 
today in support of their due process claims could be repealed 
next year if no judicial standards are established. 
A. Attorney Representation. 
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Respondents make many untrue assertions in their argument 
that attorney representation is not needed in original parole 
revocation hearings. For example, at the present time the 
offender is not given a full opportunity to rebut any information 
relied upon by the Board and afterwards by way of personal 
correspondence with the Board, See opening Brief of these amicus 
curiae pages 27-31. 
Likewise, the use of a special attention hearing or a 
petition for rehearing is solely discretionary with the Board and 
is only granted in exceptional cases. Such procedures cannot be 
used in place of an effective advocacy proceeding in the first 
instance. 
The claim that the present rule permits the Board to make 
determinations of attorney representation is also erroneous. 
These amicus curiae know of no instance in which an attorney has 
been allowed to actively represent and participate in an original 
parole hearing. When these inflated claims of present procedure 
are eliminated from Respondents1 arguments, the need for attorney 
representation becomes more apparent. 
Respondents claim that "an attorney in a parole grant hearing 
provides little if any value in protecting an offender's interest 
in the possibility of parole." (Respondents1 Brief, 34). While 
this statement may be true in some routine cases, it is certainly 
not true in many cases. An attorney can assist an inmate in 
reviewing the file for accuracy, in refuting prejudicial or 
erroneous information, and in making a formal presentation to the 
Board. Often, inmates do not have the verbal skills required to 
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eloquently state the basis of their situation. 
The remainder of the arguments raised by Respondents are 
hardly worthy of comment. While it may be said technically that 
the Board acts in a parens patriae relationship with an offender, 
the reality of the relationship is far different. The Board has 
publicly proclaimed on numerous occasions that its first interest 
is to protect the public generally and the victims specifically 
from any wrongful conduct that could be caused by an inmate. As 
such, therefore, the interest of the prisoner is subordinate to 
the other competing interests. To state that this is similar to 
an employee-employer relationship where a "supervisor strives to 
better the company by improving the subordinates" is bordering on 
the absurd. (Respondents1 Brief, 35). To deny that the Board of 
Pardons is adversarial to the inmate is to deny realtity. 
Moreover, to claim that an attorney would interfere with the 
"dialogue between the offender and the decision maker" is also 
equally out of reality. Certainly judges have no difficulty in 
sentencing offenders to incarceration even though the offender is 
represented by an attorney during the proceeding. 
The final arguments raised by Respondents would qualify as an 
ad populum falacy, i.e., argument of emotion and prejudice rather 
than reason. Utilizing budget propaganda, Respondents paint a 
bleak picture of attorneys depleting "the state's already limited 
resources, of attorneys asking for unnecessary time delays and 
clogging the overburdened calendar of the Board, and using 
courtroom antics to obtain a more favorable ruling for their 
client." (Respondents' Brief, 36-37). These amicus curiae submit 
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that this "flood gate" argument is completely without merit. Most 
parole matters could be handled extremely expeditiously by 
attorneys in preparing their client's presentation. In many cases 
they could even shorten the hearing process by eliminating 
unnecessary issues before the Board. Likewise, the Board will 
have its power to regulate its own calendar just as does a court 
and any abuses by attorneys can be handled administratively or 
through attorney disciplinary actions. These same arguments have 
been made throughout the course of judicial history each time it 
is decided that an accused, defendant, or inmate is entitled to 
increased legal representation. 
Finally, an "all or nothing" approach of representation is 
not the only alternative. Assuming that the inmates have proper 
access to their file, attorney representation could be limited to 
those instances where the inmate disputes relevant information 
contained in the file or where his or her sentence will exceed the 
matrix guideline established in the trial and post-trial 
proceedings. Since many inmates have pled guilty in complete 
reliance upon these matrixes thereby saving the state millions of 
dollars each year in trial costs, it is only proper that some 
additional expense be incurred whenever these matrix guidelines 
are being exceeded. 
B. Access to the Board's Files. 
The heart of the Foote litigation concerned his inability to 
know what accusations were being made against him by anonymous 
letters contained in the file of the Board of Pardons. Many of 
these amicus curiae inmates have similar instances in which they 
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believe their sentences have been wrongfully extended because of 
such information. In some cases confusion of inmate names has 
resulted in incorrect criminal records being charged against 
parole seekers. These amicus have previously discussed this 
important right in their opening Brief. (Amicus Curiae Brief, 
22-26) . 
Attached to this Brief are several letters of correspondence 
between inmates and the prison administration concerning access to 
files. These documents show that inmates attempting to obtain 
access to their file still face formidable obstacles in obtaining 
the relevant information upon which the Board will base its 
decision. For example, even though a defendant has presumably 
seen his presentence report at the time of the court-imposed 
sentencing he is nevertheless denied access to this report for 
review during his entire imprisonment even though such report may 
be extremely pertinent to the decision by the Board. 
The implementation of the new Government Records Access and 
Management Act is of little assistanceto the inmates. Section 
63-2-304 provides that the following are deemed "protected 
records:" 
* * * 
9. Records the disclosure of which would 
jeopardize the life or safety of another individual; 
* * * 
11. Records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize 
the security or safety of a correctional facility, or 
records relating to incarceration, treatment, probation, 
or parole, that would interfere with the control and 
supervision of an offender's incarceration, treatment, 
probation or parole; 
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12- Records that, if disclosed, would reveal 
recommendations made to the Board of Pardons by an 
employee of or contractor for the Department of 
Corrections, the Board of Pardons, or the Department of 
Humane Services that are based on the employee's or 
contractor's supervision, diagnosis, or treatment of any 
person within the Board's jurisdiction. 
Moreover, if an inmate is to have any ability to obtain 
improperly classified documents he will need many months to appeal 
an adverse ruling under the appellate provision of the section. 
63-2-409, et seq. Certainly, the present seven-day notice of 
hearing is totally inadequate to make any attempt to obtain 
documents under this new management act. 
It is respectfully suggested that the procedures urged in the 
opening brief by these amicus curiae and formulated by several 
courts throughout the country be adopted as the procedure for 
access to inmate information. The new access to information law 
shall be used to supplement any deficiencies which may be found 
to exist under the prison access system. 
C. Evidentiary Hearings. 
The requirement of an evidentiary hearing is closely related 
to the access of an inmate's file by the inmate or his attorney. 
If, for example, the file contains no information that the inmate 
opposes the need for an evidentiary hearing would be minimal. In 
those cases where claimed erroneous information exists, however, 
an evidentiary hearing may be essential to eliminate false 
information or false accusations. See opening Brief of these 
amicus curiae pages 27-31. 
Once again Respondents argue emotion rather than reason. 
They contend that if additional procedures are implemented the 
normal twenty-minute per case hearing time will increase thereby 
decreasing the number of available hearings per year. Respondents 
contend, "As a result, the Board will be forced to limit the 
number of times an inmate will be heard and/or lengthen the number 
of years an inmate will have to wait prior to receiving an 
original or redetermination hearing." (Respondents1 Brief, 38). 
Certainly, an inmate who may be facing a five or six year 
rehearing is entitled to the fullest due process protection 
available in insuring that a fair decision is made. Part of the 
present problem may well be that the twenty-minute allotment per 
case is simply insufficient. If additional time is required in 
order to insure a fair hearing then it will be up to the 
Legislature of this state to provide additional staff to provide 
adequate hearings. The "floodgate" argument cannot be used by 
Respondents to deny inmates the opportunity of a fair hearing when 
essentially their entire lives are at stake. Just as in the case 
of double-bunking and other constitutional mandated requirements, 
the state is obligated to comply with judicial mandates even 
though it is not a financially pleasant obligation. Similarly, 
the fact that additional attorneys may be needed to represent the 
state in any type of evidentiary hearing is not a reason to deny 
the existence of such hearings when necessary. 
Finally, the purpose of evidentiary hearings is not to retry 
the conviction of an inmate but is to insure that accurate and 
reliable information is being presented to the Board in making its 
parole determination. In many instances, the false or malicious 
information that is contained in the Board's file is given by 
non-victims who for one motivation or another wish to keep the 
inmate incarcerated. Frequently, for example, ex-spouses, other 
inmates and personal enemies are the sources of information that 
the Board of Pardons relies upon in making its determination. 
Since the victim is already allowed by Utah law to openly express 
their feelings and since the inmate is allowed by Utah law to 
respond to such expression, the requirement of an evidentiary 
hearing would in very few instances have any effect on victims 
themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondents have spent nearly three-fourths of their 
Brief in arguing why the question of inmate rights during parole 
hearings should not be decided by this Court. Understandably, the 
Respondents wish to avoid this Court determined question since 
such avoidance will allow them to carry on business as usual. 
Change is always feared—the Board of Pardons is no exception. 
Just as in many instances in the past, however, change is 
required under our living and dynamic constitutional system of 
law. That which was accepted in the past can no longer be 
tolerated in the present. Rights of slaves, women, workers, 
minorities, handicapped are all significantly different than when 
these issues were first litigated. Likewise, the time has come to 
decide what rights some 5,000 state inmates are entitled to assert 
when their day of actual sentencing arrives—the parole hearing 
before the Board of Pardons. 
These amicus curiae inmates are grateful to have had the 
opportunity to input their thinking into this extremely 
significant decision. It is hoped that this Court will provide 
substantial due process procedures in the future to insure that 
all inmates will be treated fairly in the parole proceedings that 
govern their collective and individual fate. 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 1992. 
Craig S. Cc 
Attorney for Utah State 
Prison Inmates Amicus Curiae 
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ADDENDUM 
ROGER S. LEFEVRE #21439 
WASATCH BAKER 213 
P.O. BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020-0250 
November 24, 1992 
Administrator 
Board of Pardons 
State of Utah 
448 East 6400 South (Third Floor) 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Re: Request for Access to Information 
Dear Administrator: 
In accordance with R655-303 (Offender Access to 
Information) of the Utah Administrative Code, and the mandate 
of the Utah Supreme Court1, please be kind enough to provide 
me with copies of the documents and other information which 
is contained in my file maintained at the Board of Pardons 
and/or Utah Department of Corrections* I understand that 
there might be a charge for these copies. 
Thank you for your assistance with this request. 
Respectfully, 
Roierr S. LeFevre 
1
 State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707 (Utah 1986) 
Gorman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
H.L. (Pete) Haun 
Chairman 
Donald E. Blanchard 
Michael R. Sibbett 
William L. Paten 
Heather N.Cooke 
Members 
State of Utah 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
448 East 6400 South - Suite 300 
Murray, Utah 84107 
(801)261-6464 
December 1, 1992 
Roger S. Lefevre, USP# 21439 
Utah State Prison 
P. O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. Lefevre: 
This letter is in response to your request for information in 
your file* 
Like other offenders' files, your file contains its own 
variation of the following categories of information: 
(1) Public information, including judgment and commitment 
orders, prior Board dispositions, and parole agreements; 
(2) Information generated from Adult Probation and Parole, 
including presentence and postsentence reports, probation 
violation reports, parole progress and violation reports, and 
diagnostic reports; 
(3) Prison information, including Board reports, 
disciplinaries, progress and rescission reports, and 
psychologicals; 
(4) Information generated internally for the Board, including 
its own work product, routings, worksheets, guidelines 
matrices, alienist reports, $nd warrant requests; 
(5) Other criminal justice information including police 
reports and prosecutorial reports, recommendations from 
sentencing judges, criminal record data, other court 
documents; 
(6) All correspondence sent to the Board from and concerning 
you* 
In accordance with Chapter 2, Title 63, Government Records 
Access and Management Act, the Board of Pardons shall provide you 
with a copy of public and private records in your file. These 
documents include disposition forms reflecting the Board's prior 
decisions concerning you, letters to and from you, and information 
submitted by you or at your request. 
Many of the documents in your file cannot be released because 
they affect not just your privacy interests; but also the privacy 
and safety interests of persons who submitted information to the 
Board* Access to other documents is specifically restricted by 
statute; for example, the presentence investigation report, 
institutional progress report and diagnostic reports. 
We have reviewed your file and have approximately ll pages 
which may be released to you. Upon receipt of the copying costs of 
• 10 cents per page, a total of $1.10, we will forward the 
photocopied documents to you. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-27-8 and 
administrative policy, the Board will provide you with a cassette 
recording of the hearing for a $5.00 fee, which represents the cost 
of the cassette and processing fee. If you desire a type written 
transcript, copies may be obtained for $2.25 per page after you 
remit a $20.00 deposit. The average length is 10 to 15 pages with 
a processing time of one month. If however, you state in an 
Affidavit that you are unable to pay for a transcript which is 
necessary for further proceedings, and the Affidavit is not 
refuted, the Board may order that a copy of the hearing be 
furnished to you at no expense. Before we can process your 
request, you will need to forward your full name, USP#, and date of 
the hearing. 
In anticipation of your next hearing before the Board, the 
Board will provide a written notice of the hearing to you and a 
summary of the information it intends to use in making its 
decision. This summary will not disclose controlled, protected, or 
confidential information where prohibited by law. At the hearing, 
the Board will verbally summarize any additional information that 
may influence the Board's decision. Before any decision is 
reached, you will be given the opportunity at that hearing to 
respond to the information. 
If you allege a factual inaccuracy in any of the summarized 
information, the Board shall, as to each matter controverted, 
either make a finding as to the allegation or make a determination 
that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted 
will not be taken into account in the Board's decision. 
I hope this has answered your inquiry. 
November 24, 1992 
NOV i ' 1992 
Mr. Alan Anthony 
Administrator 
Field Operations, Region III 
Department of Corrections 
State of Utah 
275 East 200 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Request for copy of Presentence Report 
Dear Mr. Anthony: 
In accordance with Rule 4-203 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, and the mandates by decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court1, please be kind enough to provide me a 
copy of my Presentence Report completed in March 1990 (along 
with any supplement thereto). 
Your assistance with this request is appreciated* 




Ut-ah State Prison 
Wasatch Baker 213 
Draper, Utah 84020 
1 State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 
(Utah 1982), 656 P.2d 1005 
(Utah 1985). 
1241 (Utah 1980), State v. Casarez, 
and State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 
Norman H. Ban*erter 
Governor 
O. Lane McCotter 
Executive Director 
James EL Gillespie Jr. 
Director* Fitld Operation* 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
FIELD OPERATIONS 
Region HI 
275 Bast 200 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake Cfty, Utah 64111 
(801)533-4984 
December 1, 1992 
Mr. Roger S. LeFevre 
#21439 
Utah State Prison 
Wasatch Baker 213 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. LeFevre: 
I am in receipt of your letter dated November 24, 1992 requesting 
a copy of your Presentence Investigation Report. We give out 
that report as provided in 77-18-1 Utah Code or under order of 
the court* 77-18-1 specifies that the presentence report is 
confidential and, as it pertains to you, is limited to "...the 
defendant or his counsel for sentencing purposes only...91. Since 
your sentencing has already occurred, it is the position of our 
agency that you are not entitled to a copy of the report at this 
time. 
Sincerely, 
ALAN ANTHONY, nal Administrator 
cc: Ray Wahl, Deputy Director 
Field Operations 
